John C. Calhoun, "On Nullification and the Force Bill."
U.S. Senate, 15 February 1833
Mr. President:
At the last session of Congress, it was avowed on all sides that
the public debt, as to all practical purposes, was in fact paid,
the small surplus remaining being nearly covered by the money in
the Treasury and the bonds for duties which had already accrued;
but with the arrival of this event our last hope was doomed to be
disappointed. After a long session of many months, and the most
earnest effort on the part of South Carolina and the other
Southern States to obtain relief, all that could be effected was
a small reduction of such a character that, while it diminished
the amount of burden, it distributed that burden more unequally
than even the obnoxious Act of 1828; reversing the principle
adopted by the Bill of 1816, of laying higher duties on the
unprotected than the protected articles, by repealing almost
entirely the duties laid upon the former, and imposing the burden
almost entirely on the latter. It was thus that, instead of
relief-- instead of an equal distribution of burdens and benefits
of the government, on the payment of the debt, as had been fondly
anticipated--the duties were so arranged as to be, in fact,
bounties on one side and taxation on the other; thus placing the
two great sections of the country in direct conflict in reference
to its fiscal action, and thereby letting in that flood of
political corruption which threatens to sweep away our
Constitution and our liberty.
This unequal and unjust arrangement was pronounced, both by the
administration, through its proper organ, the Secretary of the
Treasury, and by the opposition, to be a *permanent* adjustment;
and it was thus that all hope of relief through the action of the
general government terminated; and the crisis so long apprehended
at length arrived, at which the State was compelled to choose
between absolute acquiescence in a ruinous system of oppression,
or a resort to her reserved powers--powers of which she alone was
the rightful judge, and which only, in this momentous juncture,
could save her. She determined on the latter.
The consent of two-thirds of her Legislature was necessary for
the call of a convention, which was considered the only
legitimate organ through which the people, in their sovereignty,
could speak. After an arduous struggle the States-rights party
succeeded; more than two-thirds of both branches of the
Legislature favorable to a convention were elected; a convention
was called--the ordinance adopted. The convention was succeeded
by a meeting of the Legislature, when the laws to carry the
ordinance into execution were enacted--all of which have been
communicated by the President, have been referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary, and this bill is the result of their
labor.
Having now corrected some of the prominent misrepresentations as
to the nature of this controversy, and given a rapid sketch of
the movement of the State in reference to it, I will next proceed
to notice some objections connected with the ordinance and the
proceedings under it.
The first and most prominent of these is directed against what is
called the test oath, which an effort has been made to render
odious. So far from deserving the denunciation that has been
levelled against it, I view this provision of the ordinance as
but the natural result of the doctrines entertained by the
State, and the position which she occupies. The people of
Carolina believe that the Union is a union of States, and not of
individuals; that it was formed by the States, and that the
citizens of the several States were bound to it through the acts
of their several States; that each State ratified the
Constitution for itself, and that it was only by such
ratification of a State that any obligation was imposed upon its
citizens. Thus believing, it is the opinion of the people of
Carolina that it belongs to the State which has imposed the
obligation to declare, in the last resort, the extent of this
obligation, as far as her citizens are concerned; and this upon
the plain principles which exist in all analogous cases of
compact between sovereign bodies. On this principle the people
of the State, acting in their sovereign capacity in convention,
precisely as they did in the adoption of their own and the
Federal Constitution, have declared, by the ordinance, that the
acts of Congress which imposed duties under the authority to lay
imposts, were acts not for revenue, as intended by the
Constitution, but for protection, and therefore null and void.
The ordinance thus enacted by the people of the State themselves,
acting as a sovereign community, is as obligatory on the citizens
of the State as any portion of the Constitution. In prescribing,
then, the oath to obey the ordinance, no more was done than to
prescribe an oath to obey the Constitution. It is, in fact, but
a particular oath of allegiance, and in every respect similar to
that which is prescribed, under the Constitution of the United
States, to be administered to all the officers of the State and
Federal governments; and is no more deserving the harsh and
bitter epithets which have been heaped upon it than that or any
similar oath. It ought to be borne in mind that, according to
the opinion which prevails in Carolina, the right of resistance
to the unconstitutional acts of Congress belongs to the State,
and not to her individual citizens; and that, though the latter
may, in a mere question of *meum* and *tuum,* resist through the
courts an unconstitutional encroachment upon their rights, yet
the final stand against usurpation rests not with them, but with
the State of which they are members; and such act of resistance
by a State binds the conscience and allegiance of the citizen.
But there appears to be a general misapprehension as to the
extent to which the State has acted under this part of the
ordinance. Instead of sweeping every officer by a general
proscription of the minority, as has been represented in debate,
as far as my knowledge extends, not a single individual has been
removed. The State has, in fact, acted with the greatest
tenderness, all circumstances considered, toward citizens who
differed from the majority; and, in that spirit, has directed the
oath to be administered only in the case of some official act
directed to be performed in which obedience to the ordinance is
involved....
It is next objected that the enforcing acts have legislated the
United States out of South Carolina. I have already replied to
this objection on another occasion, and will now but repeat what
I then said: that they have been legislated out only to the
extent that they had no right to enter. The Constitution has
admitted the jurisdiction of the United States within the limits
of the several States only so far as the delegated powers
authorize; beyond that they are intruders, and may rightfully be
expelled; and that they have been efficiently expelled by the
legislation of the State through her civil process, as has been
acknowledged on all sides in the debate, is only a confirmation
of the truth of the doctrine for which the majority in Carolina
have contended.
The very point at issue between the two parties there is,
whether nullification is a peaceful and an efficient remedy
against an unconstitutional act of the general government, and
may be asserted, as such, through the State tribunals. Both
parties agree that the acts against which it is directed are
unconstitutional and oppressive. The controversy is only as to
the means by which our citizens may be protected against the
acknowledged encroachments on their rights. This being the point
at issue between the parties, and the very object of the majority
being an efficient protection of the citizens through the State
tribunals, the measures adopted to enforce the ordinance, of
course, received the most decisive character. We were not
children, to act by halves. Yet for acting thus efficiently the
State is denounced, and this bill reported, to overrule, by
military force, the civil tribunal and civil process of the
State! Sir, I consider this bill, and the arguments which have
been urged on this floor in its support, as the most triumphant
acknowledgment that nullification is peaceful and efficient, and
so deeply intrenched in the principles of our system, that it
cannot be assailed but by prostrating the Constitution, and
substituting the supremacy of military force in lieu of the
supremacy of the laws. In fact, the advocates of this bill
refute their own argument. They tell us that the ordinance is
unconstitutional; that it infracts the Constitution of South
Carolina, although, to me, the objection appears absurd, as it
was adopted by the very authority which adopted the Constitution
itself. They also tell us that the Supreme Court is the
appointed arbiter of all controversies between a State and the
general government. Why, then, do they not leave this
controversy to that tribunal? Why do they not confide to them
the abrogation of the ordinance, and the laws made in pursuance
of it, and the assertion of that supremacy which they claim for
the laws of Congress? The State stands pledged to resist no
process of the court. Why, then, confer on the President the
extensive and unlimited powers provided in this bill? Why
authorize him to use military force to arrest the civil process
of the State? But one answer can be given: That, in a contest
between the State and the general government, if the resistance
be limited on both sides to the civil process, the State, by its
inherent sovereignty, standing upon its reserved powers, will
prove too powerful in such a controversy, and must triumph over
the Federal government, sustained by its delegated and limited
authority; and in this answer we have an acknowledgment of the
truth of those great principles for which the State has so firmly
and nobly contended....
Notwithstanding all that has been said, I may say that neither
the Senator from Delaware (Mr. Clayton), nor any other who has
spoken on the same side, has directly and fairly met the great
question at issue: Is this a Federal Union? a union of States, as
distinct from that of individuals? Is the sovereignty in the
several States, or in the American people in the aggregate? The
very language which we are compelled to use when speaking of our
political institutions affords proof conclusive as to its real
character. The terms union, federal, united, all imply a
combination of sovereignties, a confederation of States. They
never apply to an association of individuals. Who ever heard of
the United State of New York, of Massachusetts, or of Virginia?
Who ever heard the term federal or union applied to the
aggregation of individuals into one community? Nor is the other
point less clear--that the sovereignty is in the several States,
and that our system is a union of twenty-four sovereign powers,
under a constitutional compact, and not of a divided sovereignty
between the States severally and the United States? In spite of
all that has been said, I maintain that sovereignty is in its
nature indivisible. It is the supreme power in a State, and we
might just as well speak of half a square, or half of a triangle,
as of half a sovereignty. It is a gross error to confound the
*exercise* of sovereign powers with *sovereignty* itself, or the
*delegation* of such powers with the *surrender* of them. A
sovereign may delegate his powers to be exercised by as many
agents as he may think proper, under such conditions and with
such limitations as he may impose; but to surrender any portion
of his sovereignty to another is to annihilate the whole. The
Senator from Delaware (Mr. Clayton) calls this metaphysical
reasoning, which he says he cannot comprehend. If by metaphysics
he means that scholastic refinement which makes distinctions
without difference, no one can hold it in more utter contempt
than I do; but if, on the contrary, he means the power of
analysis and combination--that power which reduces the most
complex idea into its elements, which traces causes to their
first principle, and, by the power of generalization and
combination, unites the whole in one harmonious system--then, so
far from deserving contempt, it is the highest attribute of the
human mind. It is the power which raises man above the
brute--which distinguishes his faculties from mere sagacity,
which he holds in common with inferior animals. It is this power
which has raised the astronomer from being a mere gazer at the
stars to the high intellectual eminence of a Newton or a Laplace,
and astronomy itself from a mere observation of isolated facts
into that noble science which displays to our admiration the
system of the universe. And shall this high power of the mind,
which has effected such wonders when directed to the laws which
control the material world, be forever prohibited, under a
senseless cry of metaphysics, from being applied to the high
purposes of political science and legislation? I hold them to be
subject to laws as fixed as matter itself, and to be as fit a
subject for the application of the highest intellectual power.
Denunciation may, indeed, fall upon the philosophical inquirer
into these first principles, as it did upon Galileo and Bacon,
when they first unfolded the great discoveries which have
immortalized their names; but the time will come when truth will
prevail in spite of prejudice and denunciation, and when politics
and legislation will be considered as much a science as astronomy
and chemistry.
In connection with this part of the subject, I understood the
Senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives) to say that sovereignty was
divided, and that a portion remained with the States severally,
and that the residue was vested in the Union. By Union, I
suppose, the Senator meant the United States. If such be his
meaning--if he intended to affirm that the sovereignty was in the
twenty-four States, in whatever light he may view them, our
opinions will not disagree; but according to my conception, the
whole sovereignty is in the several States, while the exercise of
sovereign power is divided--a part being exercised under compact,
through this general government, and the residue through the
separate State governments. But if the Senator from Virginia
(Mr. Rives) means to assert that the twenty-four States form but
one community, with a single sovereign power as to the objects of
the Union, it will be but the revival of the old question, of
whether the Union is a union between States, as distinct
communities, or a mere aggregate of the American people, as a
mass of individuals; and in this light his opinions would lead
directly to consolidation....
Disguise it as you may, the controversy is one between power and
liberty; and I tell the gentlemen who are opposed to me, that, as
strong as may be the love of power on their side, the love of
liberty is still stronger on ours. History furnishes many
instances of similar struggles, where the love of liberty has
prevailed against power under every disadvantage, and among them
few more striking than that of our own Revolution; where, as
strong as was the parent country, and feeble as were the
Colonies, yet, under the impulse of liberty, and the blessing of
God, they gloriously triumphed in the contest. There are,
indeed, many striking analogies between that and the present
controversy. They both originated substantially in the same
cause--with this difference--in the present case, the power of
taxation is converted into that of regulating industry; in the
other the power of regulating industry, by the regulation of
commerce, was attempted to be converted into the power of
taxation. Were I to trace the analogy further, we should find
that the perversion of the taxing power, in the one case, has
given precisely the same control to the northern section over the
industry of the southern section of the Union, which the power to
regulate commerce gave to Great Britain over the industry of the
Colonies in the other; and that the very articles in which the
Colonies were permitted to have a free trade, and those in which
the mother-country had a monopoly, are almost identically the
same as those in which the Southern States are permitted to have
a free trade by the Act of 1832, and in which the Northern States
have, by the same act, secured a monopoly. The only difference
is in the means. In the former, the Colonies were permitted to
have a free trade with all countries south of Cape Finisterre, a
cape in the northern part of Spain; while north of that, the
trade of the Colonies was prohibited, except through the
mother-country, by means of her commercial regulations. If we
compare the products of the country north and south of Cape
Finisterre, we shall find them almost identical with the list of
last year. Nor does the analogy terminate here. The very
arguments resorted to at the commencement of the American
Revolution, and the measures adopted, and the motives assigned to
bring on that contest (to enforce the law), are almost
identically the same.
But to return from this digression to the consideration of the
bill. Whatever difference of opinion may exist upon other
points, there is one on which I should suppose there can be none;
that this bill rests upon principles which, if carried out, will
ride over State sovereignties, and that it will be idle for any
advocates hereafter to talk of State rights. The Senator from
Virginia (Mr. Rives) says that he is the advocate of State
rights; but he must permit me to tell him that, although he may
differ in premises from the other gentlemen with whom he acts on
this occasion, yet, in supporting this bill, he obliterates every
vestige of distinction between him and them, saving only that,
professing the principles of '98, his example will be more
pernicious than that of the most open and bitter opponent of the
rights of the States. I will also add, what I am compelled to
say, that I must consider him (Mr. Rives) as less consistent than
our old opponents, whose conclusions were fairly drawn from their
premises, while his premises ought to have led him to opposite
conclusions. The gentleman has told us that the new-fangled
doctrines, as he chooses to call them, have brought State rights
into disrepute. I must tell him, in reply, that what he calls
new- fangled are but the doctrines of '98; and that it is he (Mr.
Rives), and others with him, who, professing these doctrines,
have degraded them by explaining away their meaning and efficacy.
He (Mr. R.) has disclaimed, in behalf of Virginia, the
authorship of nullification. I will not dispute that point. If
Virginia chooses to throw away one of her brightest ornaments,
she must not hereafter complain that it has become the property
of another. But while I have, as a representatives of Carolina,
no right to complain of the disavowal of the Senator from
Virginia, I must believe that he (Mr. R.) has done his native
State great injustice by declaring on this floor, that when she
gravely resolved, in '98, that "in cases of deliberate and
dangerous infractions of the Constitution, the States, as parties
to the compact, have the right, and are in duty bound, to
interpose to arrest the progress of the evil, and to maintain
within their respective limits the authorities, rights, and
liberties appertaining to them," she meant no more than to
proclaim the right to protest and to remonstrate. To suppose
that, in putting forth so solemn a declaration, which she
afterward sustained by so able and elaborate an argument, she
meant no more than to assert what no one had ever denied, would
be to suppose that the State had been guilty of the most
egregious trifling that ever was exhibited on so solemn an
occasion.
The End